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0. Introduction 
There is a long-standing notion that in most instances of language use, the partici-
pants (whether speaking or writing) organize their production into coherent 
stretches identifiable as 'topics'. There is the further notion that these topics have 
easily definable beginnings and ends, allowing them to be labeled and strung 
together into a list or hierarchy which forms a useful schematic of what occurred 
during a given stretch of discourse. The preliminary rationale goes as follows: 
The conversationalists stop talking about 'money' and move on to 'sex'. A chunk of 
conversational discourse, then, can be treated as a unit of some kind because it is on a 
particular 'topic'. The notion of 'topic' is clearly an intuitively satisfactory way of 
describing the unifying principle which makes one stretch of discourse 'about' something 
and the next stretch 'about' something else, for it is appealed to very frequently in the 
discourse analysis literature. (Brown & Yule 1983 :70) 
It was along these lines that Keenan & Schieffelin (1976) introduced the 'dis-
course topic' as the "question of immediate concern", "a proposition (about which 
some claim is made or elicited)". This intuition seems to argue for parsing dis-
course in terms of separate topics, each identifiable by a single phrase or sentence. 
As Brown & Yule and many later analysts have recognized, such a view is far 
too simplistic. Their own concept of a "topic framework" is defined as the con-
textual framework "within which the topic is constituted'', consisting of 
"activated features of context ... those aspects of the context which are directly 
reflected in the text, and which need to be called upon to interpret the text" 
1 This paper is basically a summary of my (unpublished) Master's thesis, Deconstructing 'topic': 
Relevance, consciousness, and the momentum of ideas (Park-Doob 2001). I'd like to thank my 
advisor David McNeill, and my colleagues in the McNeill Lab, including Karl-Erik McCullough, 
Chris Corcoran, Sue Duncan, KaLynne Harris, Nobuhiro Furuyama, Irene Kirnbara, Fey Parrill, 
Mika Ishino, Arny Franklin, Arika Okrent, Nicla Rossini, and Gale Stam. Recent work has been 
supported by NSF KDI grant No. BCS-9980054, "Cross-Modal Analysis of Signal and Sense: 
Multimedia Corpora and Tools for Gesture, Speech, and Gaze Research", Francis Quek, P.l. 
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(Brown & Yule 1983:75). This formulation presents a few problems. In particular, 
the features of context which are salient for participants, at the time of interaction, 
may not all be later identifiable by the analyst, nor will they necessarily all be 
directly reflected in the "text". In an effort to go beyond both the text-based 
tradition and the speech-focused tradition, a growing body of work studying face-
to-face narrative and conversation has been exploring the complex ways in which 
people communicate using the visuo-spatial and verbal modalities in synchrony 
(cf. McNeill 1992, papers in McNeill 2000). With a high-resolution audio/video 
recording of an interaction, the analyst has a view to the spontaneous hand 
gestures, facial expressions, body postures, and eye-gaze used in synchrony with 
speech by the participants, in addition to information about their physical envi-
ronment. Given that even the best possible audio/video recording still fails to 
provide the analyst with a great deal of the information available at the time to the 
participants themselves, it seems clear that using just audio recordings and, worst 
of all, just written transcriptions to study conversation will provide limited 
insights (or even worse, result in false conclusions). Brown & Yule's "topic 
framework", though fairly bogged down in a tradition of research using written 
transcripts, does at least highlight the critical necessity of examining both the 
fluid shared context in which any conversation is situated, as well as all available 
data from the conversation thus far, and points to the necessity for conversational 
participants to make their contributions relevant to the currently salient elements 
of the context and to the currently "activated" elements from the conversation 
thus far. Relatively few scholars have emphasized the importance of the interac-
tively constructed, dialogic nature of language phenomena (Clark (1996) and 
Linell ( 1998) stand out favorably). Especially important is Rommetveit's (1974) 
concept of intersubjectivity in interaction, "in which there exists a partial 
complementarity, temporary reciprocity, and above all a shared consciousness 
among the interlocutors" (O'Connell & Kowal, in press). 
In this paper I will assume that participants in a conversation express ideas of 
some sort, and that their contributions are relevant, to a greater or lesser degree, to 
what has recently been, or is currently being, expressed or talked about. I use the 
word idea here in a purposefully vague sense, to mean any expressible notion, 
able to be communicated in any way. Jakobson (1960) provides a classic intro-
duction to the multiple functions language is capable of handling simultaneously. 
1. Two modern attempts to improve on the 'discourse topic' 
Rather than parse discourse by labeling chunks with individual topics, a system 
has been devised by Barbara Grosz and colleagues (cf. Nakatani et al. 1995) that 
assumes segments of spoken discourse have a specific purpose underlying them, 
agreeing with Brown & Yule's statement that "any consideration of topic involves 
asking why the speaker said what he said in a particular discourse situation" 
(1983 :77). The system described in Nakatani et al. (1995) involves parsing a 
monologue into a hierarchical structure of large segments with broad purpose, 
each embedded with smaller nested subsegments of increasingly specific purpose. 
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The success of such a purpose hierarchy analysis requires that the segments and 
subsegments have clearly identifiable beginnings and ends, and that they each 
have clearly identifiable purposes and nested subpurposes. Each subpurpose must 
succeed in supporting the broader purpose(s) above it in the hierarchy. 
Herb Clark differs from many analysts by making explicit the claim that all 
language is a form of joint action (Clark 1996). He acknowledges the cooperative, 
emergent, and opportunistically created nature of conversation, and wisely 
remarks that transcripts are only "footprints in the sand" (337), imperfect records 
of the dynamic processes of language in use. Naturally, he finds that "discourse 
topic is a static notion that doesn't do justice to the dynamic course of joint 
actions and what develops out of them" (342). To get around the question of 
'topic' in interaction, he suggests joint actions are generally part of joint projects, 
which are structured hierarchically by smaller subprojects. What we get is a 
project hierarchy analysis which rather resembles the purpose hierarchies of 
Grosz and colleagues, but differs crucially in that the projects and subprojects are 
viewed as dynamic processes, not static objects with set purpose. In the coding 
scheme illustrated by Clark (343), each project and subproject requires a clear 
beginning and end, consciously agreed upon by the participants, and subprojects 
are placed at specific levels of embeddedness. Thus the two coding systems are 
similar in that each segment requires clear boundaries, and must have clear 
placement in a hierarchy. In the following sections we will discuss data that 
cooperate with these requirements, as well as data that illustrate their pitfalls. 
2. The experiment 
Before presenting data from recorded conversations, a few introductory remarks 
are in order. I originally recorded all the examples discussed below as part of a 
McNeill Lab study meant to elicit spontaneous gestures in two-person conversa-
tions (approximately 65 pairs of participants were recorded in 1999 and 2000; the 
participants cited here were all undergraduates at the University of Chicago). The 
present work grew out of my attempts to parse the results into purpose hierarchies 
inspired by Nakatani et al. (1995). Those attempts were done as a first pass, 
without special emphasis on examining gestures, and likewise I will not raise 
specific points about gestures in this paper. It should be noted, however, that all 
my judgments were made based on repeated observation of the video taped data, 
which allowed me to make qualitative observations about the participants' physi-
cal interaction with their environment and each other (including their gestures) 
and undoubtedly increased the accuracy of my judgments. 
The experiment proceeded as follows: participant B remained outside the 
experiment room while participant A examined a sheet of instructions pertaining 
to a plastic model city placed in front of his or her chair. The model was about 
three feet square and had five buildings: a movie theater, train station, church, and 
two houses (called #33 and #35). The instructions, which were the same for each 
pair of participants, outlined the following rather comical scenario: a family of 
intelligent wombats had taken up residence in the abandoned movie theater of the 
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tiny town of Arlee, and it was the participants' job to recruit helpers from the 
town, flush out the wombats, capture them, and send them back to Australia. 
Participant A was instructed to describe the scenario to participant B, and together 
they were to design a creative plan of action (using the model city as a guide), and 
decide on what materials would be needed and how they would be used. 
3. When the methodology works, and when it fails ... 
Example (I) below is a small sample of a purpose hierarchy, the first draft of 
which was created by KaLynne Harris and me during the summer of 2000. Each 
segment is headlined by a verb phrase describing its purpose, and each line 
represents one intonation unit, a single communicative pulse which is also defin-
able in prosodic terms (see Chafe 1994:57-70). Please refer to the transcription 
conventions listed at the end of the paper (paraphrased from Chafe 1994 and 
1997, with a few additions based on McNeill Lab conventions). Given that the 
transcription is a mere shadow of the real interaction, it is mainly designed for 
maximum readability. I have attempted to keep the data relatively free of clutter, 
while still trying to provide hints to what the speech actually sounded like. 
(1) 6.5 =discuss roles of A and B after wombats are rounded up in pen 
A #an' s6==, 
A #while, 
6.5.1 = go into details about B's role 
A ... since y6u're out front doing nothing but banging your p6t .. {1[nn] 1 yer sh}-
B .. 1 [yeah. J1 
A .. with your stick, 
6.5.1.1 = refute A. clarify role 
B well I'm 2[gonna]2 be running 3[thr6ugh.]3 
A 2[you'll-]2 ... 3[you'll-]3 you'll-you'll come @back 6ut@ 4[when-J4 
B 4[yeah.]4 
A .. when they're there. 
A #and, 
A ... y6u keep an eye on them an' i'll go with= the people in house-
A .. frome-
A w- thirty-three or thirty-five, 
6.5.2 = discuss calling authorities 
A #an' we'll call up like, 
A ... (1.2) animal control 'r whatever. 
6.6 = (unclear purpose) 
A ... an' then 
A ... we'll==, 
6.5.2 (return) =discuss calling authorities 
A ... or=, 
A ... y'know. 
A ... the authorites in Australian' we'll make a phone call an' say we have these 
wombats that need to go back to Australia or-
A #(quite loud:) or we'll call a local zoo. 
A ... (I. I) an' just be like we've caught these wombats and we need you to come 
take them== 
A like back to Australia or whatever. 
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As can be seen, the above example fits fairly well into a purpose hierarchy 
analysis, for it consists mainly of a cinematic or play-by-play description, thor-
oughly dominated by participant A, of the plan for rounding up the wombats (see 
Park-Doob 2001 for a lengthier excerpt). Her description outlines a series of 
subtasks within subtasks, all geared toward the larger task of capturing the wom-
bats, and all described in chronological order. Each subtask has an easily 
identifiable purpose functioning as a clear subpart of the larger mission goal, thus 
creating a hierarchy of tasks and nested subtasks, and so it is a straightforward 
matter to organize her speech into an identical hierarchy of purposes, each labeled 
according to what she is trying to describe. Participant B interferes very little, so 
this part of their dialogue behaves much like a monologue. Given that the discus-
sion is also highly goal oriented, it's not surprising that it works well in a Grosz-
style system, which in the case ofNakatani et al. (1995) was designed specifically 
to deal with goal oriented, task-driven monologue. 
However, ifintended for use with dialogues in general (and even many mono-
logues), the treatment above poses some severe problems. First of all, the partici-
pants may begin a subsegment with some clear subpurpose to a broader purpose, 
but then lose track of this broader purpose as the subsegment progresses. This is 
due to our limited capacity to keep track of information and, in dialogic interac-
tion, to our tendency towards unpredictable digressions and divergence (these 
issues will be discussed in detail below). The system of indentation is therefore 
potentially misleading: it places talk at absolute levels of nestedness, disregarding 
the fact that participants may lose track of the broader purpose, or digress repeat-
edly without ever returning to the previous discussion. In some conversations, we 
would be faced with a coding nightmare and find ourselves indenting beyond the 
right margin of the page! Fundamentally, speakers often shirk the broader purpose 
that led to their current discussion, even though that broader purpose may have 
been critical a few seconds before, and there may not have been a specific point of 
'purpose shift' during the intervening talk. Since there may not be any absolute 
level of hierarchical nestedness in the minds of the participants, we have no 
justification in coding a transcript this way. The best we can do is note the relative 
changes in nestedness at their moment of occurrence, and allow that the resulting 
hierarchical relationship may lose credence as talk progresses. 
The other critical problem with this analysis lies in its explicit requirement 
that talk be segmented into discrete, clearly delineated sections, each labeled with 
a specific 'purpose'. As we shall see, it is sometimes impossible to pinpoint where 
such segments begin or end. Clark's ( 1996) system of joint project hierarchies 
affords greater flexibility, but basically suffers from the same weaknesses: while 
participants may find themselves interacting jointly as if engaged in a particular 
project, there may be no clear spot where that particular project began if it has 
diverged smoothly away from the project of a few seconds before. Clark's hierar-
chical structure is also hampered by the same dependence on absolute levels of 




(2) B ... #an' maybe y'know while we're there we could .. y'know, 
#stay with them an', 
... p~ with them an', 
... eat [their foo=d an',] 1 
A 1 [bring a few-] 1 ••• beers, 
B ... fr-yeah bring a few b-
.. ingratiate ourselves with thee uh, 
# with the town= ... preacher, 
A ... 1[m-hm.] 1 
B ... 1[#] 1 with a few beers, 
... @2[@@]2 @ ... # 
A 2[@@]2 ............. # 
B may-
.. i don' know .. maybe we could get some divi=ne help, 
.. to get rid of the wo=mbats=. 
# i[m-]' 
A ... oh 1[y] 1eah. 
you're Catholic aren't you. 
B # ... yeah. 
we could ha-
··· like we could .. s=ee if they had any holy water on hand an', 
A .. @ 
B ... {w}ait .. maybe they're demonic® .. wom=bats® 1[@@@@]1 
A i[@@@@]' 
... ®and cru®cifixes. 
B .. @ 
A .. #-
B .. # and crucifixes . 
.. and gar1[lic.] 1 
A 1[tha] 1t would be really good. 
B # garlic we could use as bait, 
may2[be wombats like garlic.)2 
A 2[yeah I b,-- .. I bet th]2ere're vampires living in the-
... abandoned movie theater. 
B va3[mpire wombats.]3 
A # 3['cause you know where- #]3 where there're bats= there're 
vampires too . 
... an' once we find their cOffins we can bum'em. 
B ... yes==. 
A or expose'em to the light of day. 
# 
B ... yes= . 
••• 
1[abso] 1lutely. 
A ... 1[yeah.] 1 
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B #because y'know, 
# vampires and wombats are wont to live in .. old abandoned movie 
theaters. 
A 2 [ •• m-hm.]2 
B 2[ #]2 in small town= USA. 
A .. @ 
B ... @ 
#um=, 
A ... or-
... or helicopters. 
#maybe we could just cover the entire-
# like using helicopters we could cover the entire-
# town with a hUge net. 
(continues. . .) 
This excerpt poses a serious problem for an analyst wishing to parse it into a 
hierarchy of purposes, projects, or topics. While the participants actually do keep 
their discussion within the bounds of the task at hand, we face trouble once we try 
to parse it beyond this single over-arching project. Their talk begins with a 
discussion on partying with the townsfolk, and then follows a smoothly curving 
trajectory all the way to killing vampires. There are no 'kinks' in this trajectory. In 
other words, if we looked at any single moment during this stretch, the contribu-
tions before and after would all seem part of the same 'topic'. Then at the moment 
when participant A begins talking about helicopters, we have a sharp change 
easily identifiable by any traditional analysis as a point of 'topic shift'. The 
fundamental point is that the difference between partying with the townsfolk and 
killing vampires is certainly just as great as the difference between killing vam-
pires and using helicopters. Clearly, the participants are able to drastically alter 
the course of their discussion without relying on specific points of major transi-
tion. A traditional analysis which cuts discourse into discrete, bounded segments 
will by definition focus on the boundaries, ignoring the fact that one of these 
same segments may experience subtle yet continuous internal changes which 
result in a net difference just as great as that found at the boundaries. 
The constantly changing conversational trajectory illustrated in (2) is in no 
way abnormal. On the contrary, such a phenomenon is predictable given certain 
key aspects of human consciousness, which we examine next. 
4. The nature of consciousness 
For this discussion, we will follow Wally Chafe's model of consciousness: 
At any given moment the mind can focus on no more than a small segment of everything 
it "knows." I will be using the word consciousness here to refer to this limited activation 
process. Consciousness is an active focusing on a small part of the conscious being's self-
centered model of the surrounding world. (Chafe 1994:28) 
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Chafe goes on to describe certain key aspects of consciousness. First of all, 
consciousness has a focus which is "restless, moving constantly from one item of 
information to the next" (29). This movement is reflected linguistically in 
sequences of intonation units, as each unit "verbalizes the speaker's focus of 
consciousness at that moment" (63). Most of what is available to be focused upon 
will not be in a person's active consciousness at a given moment: 
This limited activation allows a person to interact with the surrounding world in a maxi-
mally productive way, for it would hardly be useful to activate everything a person knew 
at once. Aside from the burden such a process might place on neural resources, most of 
that vast store of information would be irrelevant to one's interests at any particular time. 
(29) 
Consciousness also maintains, as a context for its current focus, a "periphery. 
of semiactive information" (29). Once it is no longer in active focus, a given idea 
does not usually drop out of one's head immediately, but rather remains for a 
while in the semiactive realm. Each new focus then "find[s] coherence in the 
contexts provided by the surrounding semiactive information" (30). 
Furthermore, consciousness requires an orientation, which gives individuals 
information about themselves with respect to the crucial domains of "space, time, 
society, and ongoing activity" (30). How a person's consciousness is oriented can 
be said to be a part of the peripheral context which aids the understanding of each 
new focus. Brown & Yule (1983:60) suggest that interlocutors try to understand 
each other's utterances through as little processing as possible, and that they do 
this by way of an assumption of local interpretation (an interpretation based on 
the most recently put forth utterances and ideas). We can infer that a contribution 
intended to have a non-local interpretation will require more processing time and 
effort to produce and interpret. Chafe (1994: 138) remarks that boundaries 
between "episodes" of talk are often observable as points of sudden reorientation, 
with the strength of the boundary depending on how much reorientation is neces-
sary. It seems clear then that reorientation requires work. In order for a reorienting 
contribution to be coherent, the speaker must provide extra signals to aid the 
addressees in reorienting toward the new ideas, and the addressees must pick up 
on these signals and do the work of matching the speaker's new orientation. 
5. Chafe's notion of 'discourse topic' 
Equipped with an understanding ofChafe's notion of consciousness, we can move 
on to discuss his definition of 'discourse topic': 
We can think of each ... topic as an aggregate of coherently related events, states, and 
referents that are held together in some form in the speaker's semiactive consciousness. A 
topic is available for scanning by the focus of consciousness, which can play across the 
semiactive material, activating first one part and then another until the speaker decides 
that the topic has been adequately covered for whatever purpose the speaker may have in 
mind. (Chafe 1994:121) 
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While this notion is appealing, and a great deal of real conversation may occur 
this way, Chafe seems to assume that conversations always have such a structure: 
"One of the things that seems intuitively true of conversations is that they focus 
on different topics . . . at different times, moving from one topic to another" 
(Chafe 1994:121). The problem, similar to what we faced with the frameworks of 
Herb Clark ( 1996) and Barbara Grosz and her colleagues (Nakatani et al. 1995), is 
that we will fail to identify clear 'topics' in actual stretches of discourse ifthe talk 
proceeds haphazardly and without clear points where any speaker deems the talk 
has "adequately covered" the ideas whose full discussion required organization 
within a 'topic'. After a speaker initiates discussion that he or she hopes will 
remain within a particular bounded realm of semiactive consciousness, the 
participants have limited resources with which to ensure the mutual continued 
awareness of those boundaries, and they may not have even agreed on the 
boundaries in the first place. During the course of "scanning" across the semiac-
tive material with their ever-restless foci of consciousness, one or more partici-
pants may begin to lose track of the originally intended boundaries, allowing their 
understanding of the "semiactive realm" of current discussion to gradually move 
farther and farther from the original. Since consciousness has only a single, 
constantly restless focus and a limited ability to maintain peripheral attention on 
salient pieces of semiactive information, staying 'on topic' requires the tough 
work of continually re-foregrounding ideas as they pass out of active con-
sciousness, become faded in semiactive consciousness, and begin to slip out of a 
speaker's control. 
In the realm of semiactive consciousness, certain elements may remain highly 
salient while others fade away. Physical context is particularly important in this 
respect, as it plays the main role in maintaining orientation in space and time. A 
constant physical orientation provides the necessary stimuli by which many other 
elements of an interaction remain in the foreground of attention. For example, in 
(2) above, the participants allow their talk to meander without any clear 'topic' 
structure, yet all of their discussion remains confined to the realm of the model 
city and the task at hand. Their very physical presence in the lab, among its lights 
and cameras, and the model city placed before them, keep them constantly 
oriented towards these physical aspects and each other. This orientation, in tum, 
keeps the directed task near the foreground of their consciousness. What we have 
then are conversations which illustrate how the conscious mind is both con-
strained by its orientation and simultaneously left free to make innovative and 
unpredictable associations on the fly. Orientation can be thought of as a stabiliz-
ing, guiding force, from which our cognitive creativity may attempt to spring free. 
6. ldeational momentum 
In order to properly understand the coherent flow of ideas in examples such as (2) 
above, regardless of whether there appears to be an identifiable 'topic', I propose 
the notion that ideas have inertia, and that the act of communicating ideas imparts 
conversation and the ideas themselves with a sort of ideational momentum. The 
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notion of momentum implies that the participants' contributions will carry both 
magnitude and direction, meaning that the trajectory of conversation can be 
altered either gently or violently, in any direction, resulting in a path which maps 
a much more descriptive picture of the course of a conversation than a simple 
framework of topics divided by boundaries. 
Chafe has recognized that a conversation can attain "momentum", but he 
describes this momentum as something that "sustains topics" (Chafe 1994: 127). 
This is one of the things momentum is capable of, but I would rather describe it in 
more general terms, as the strength with which ideas cause conceptual associa-
tions to other ideas, whether or not these associations are 'on topic'. The human 
mind seems to involuntarily draw links from one idea to the next, in a sort of 
internal "association engine". Once communicated in a conversation, an idea 
becomes foregrounded in the consciousnesses of the participants, who each 
interpret it in their own way. Depending on the momentum it imparts to each 
person, the participants energetically or weakly draw associations to various 
related ideas, including those which may not be at all relevant to the current 
discussion. In many interactional situations, participants are expected to ignore 
these irrelevant associations and base their contributions not only on what was 
just in focus, but also on salient pieces of information still in semiactive con-
sciousness. The likelihood of divergence increases with the number of partici-
pants, both because of the increased variety in conceptual associations being 
made, and because the separate consciousnesses of separate minds, even as they 
continually reorient to each other, still have a limited ability to synchronize. 
Ideational momentum and a flexible notion of conversational trajectory still 
account for traditional points of 'topic shift': they are simply the points where the 
momentum and trajectory change most suddenly. What have so often been called 
'topics', we could assert, are fundamentally segments of smoothly changing idea-
tional momentum. Whether or not the discussion remains 'on topic' throughout 
one of these segments is a consequence not wholly under the participants' control. 
A successful 'topic' in Chafe's sense requires an actual desire to maintain, for a 
time, a discussion with conscientiously maintained boundaries, and also depends 
on the ability of the participants to overcome potentially divergent contributions. 
We noted earlier that Chafe observed stronger or weaker boundaries between 
sections of talk to be points of stronger or weaker reorientation, respectively. To 
account for this observation, we can claim that the degree of required reorienta-
tion, and the amount of effort exerted, is proportional to the degree of change in 
ideational momentum. Given the limited attention of consciousness, shifts in 
trajectory that occur gradually over large periods of time will be less noticeable 
(and require less sudden reorientation) than shifts that occur quickly, and they 
may not even be perceived by the participants. Along the same lines, a shift from 
silence to talk forces the magnitude of ideational momentum to shift suddenly 
from zero to a positive value, requiring reorientation. When the momentum has 
reached zero (as can occur during long silences or when the participants seem to 
"run out of steam"), equal effort is required to restart talk in any direction-there 
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is no longer a bias towards following the trajectory of the most recent talk. As 
expected, points of zero momentum are typical places for speakers to suddenly 
alter the discussion. Park-Doob (2001) describes many cases not shown here, but 
one spot in (2) above should suffice to illustrate the point. It is hard to depict on 
paper, but right before A brings up the idea of helicopters, the participants "run 
out of steam", a feeling which B intones with his low um=. Participant A takes up 
this cue and cautiously starts discussion down a new trajectory. Her repetition of 
or- signals her efforts to begin reorienting herself and her interlocutor to deal 
with brand new material. 
7. Conclusion 
'Discourse topics', in any sense, are simply not a requirement for coherent lan-
guage use. It takes special effort to bring about and maintain them, and their use 
arises out of a social need to discuss specific groups of ideas thoroughly and 
completely, rather than out of a cognitive requirement that discourse proceed this 
way. With the concept of ideational momentum, I have attempted to describe how 
participants in conversation navigate from one idea to the next, following a trajec-
tory that is largely unpredictable, yet illustrates many creative cognitive associa-
tions and processes that seem to form an integral part of human consciousness. 
Transcription conventions (paraphrasedfrom Chafe 1994 and 1997) 
' Primary accent (pitch deviation accompanied by loudness or lengthening) 
Secondary accent (for syllables with qualitatively less-than-primary stress) 
A very brief (on the order ofO. l seconds or less) pause or break in timing 
A "typical" pause (between around 0.1 and 0.7 seconds for most speakers, 
at times up to one second in places where this is still unmarked) 
... (2.4) A longer pause (measured in seconds) 
# A pause coinciding with an audible intake of breath 
Marks points where letters have been omitted from normal orthography in 
order to represent the pronunciation more accurately (beyond a generic 
reading in American English); also used for standard contractions 
Lengthening of the preceding vowel or consonant sound (ignoring "silent" 
elements in the orthography; for example, 'there=' 'yeah=' 'uh=') 
Marks the end of an intonation unit as having a terminal contour which is 
not sentence-final 
Marks the end of an intonation unit as having a sentence-final falling pitch 
Marks an intonation unit or word as aborted or suspended 
l ? Encloses stretches of speech that have a rising pitch contour typical of a 
yes-no question (includes many instances of"up-talk") 
@ A pulse of laughter or giggling 
@ @ Encloses words spoken while laughing or giggling 
2[ ]2 A segment of speech that overlaps with another segment uttered by a 
different speaker (indexed by common superscripts). 
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